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Introduction 
The investigation of attention has been pursued in a surprising disconnect from the 
investigation of other aspects of the mind. Much of the philosophical discussion of 
perception, belief, desire, intention, imagination or emotion, for example, revolves 
around issues of intentionality and content. Versions of the following questions will, 
thus, sound familiar to many philosophers: is perception an intentional state or is it 
fundamentally relational? Does perception have intentional content? If so, how is that 
content structured? Is it, for example, propositional? And is it conceptual or non-
conceptual? In contrast to the sophisticated and detailed treatment of these and related 
questions in the philosophy of perception (and similarly for the other mental states) 
the discussion of the corresponding questions about attention - whether it is, for 
example, intentional, propositional, or non-conceptual – insofar as it exists at all, has 
been mostly confined to casual side notes. 
One major goal of this essay is in to bring the philosophy of attention into better 
contact with other aspects of the philosophy of mind. In order to focus the discussion, 
I will investigate the following view about the nature of attention: 
The Non-Propositional Attitude View Attention is or is constituted by an 
irreducibly non-propositional, intentional mental attitude. 
According to the NPA view, attention is an intentional attitude that is normally 
directed at something other than a proposition, and cannot be reductively explained in 
terms of propositional attitudes. 
It is surprising that the NPA view has not yet been examined in any detail, as it seems 
to fit so well with how we normally talk about attention. We say that someone’s 
attention is captured by the sound of a siren, that someone pays attention to the color 
of other people’s clothing, or that a subject – in the course of a psychological 
experiment – focuses her attention on a specific grey square. Paying attention to 
something seems to exhibit the intentional directedness that also characterizes seeing 
something, fearing something, or desiring something; and the objects of attention do 
not appear to be propositions (in our examples they are sounds, colors, and grey 
squares). So, it seems – initially at least – just as plausible to think of attention as a 
non-propositional intentional attitude, as it is to think of perception, fear, and desire 
as non-propositional intentional attitudes.  
Now, the NPA view, in order to be plausible, arguably needs to be restricted to a 
certain variety of attention. It may seem misguided, for example, to locate a non-
propositional attitude in the attentive performance of a piano piece, or when someone 
plays a board game with all their attention. In what follows, I will, thus, put to one 
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side what is often called central or executive attention, where the subject’s attention is 
engaged by the performance of a task or activity. By contrast, the NPA view seems 
fairly attractive as an account of paying attention to something or, equivalently, 
attending to something (whether perceptually, by listening to it or looking at it; 
intellectually by thinking about it; or emotionally by, say, being angry at someone). 
The NPA view is also plausible as an account of having one’s attention captured by 
something (whether, again, by something one perceives or by an idea or mental 
image). My discussion will, thus, be restricted to what is often called endogenous 
attention (a certain type of internally controlled mental activity) and exogenous 
attention (the stimulus controlled attention capture). We would have made progress in 
the philosophy of attention, if we could show the NPA view to be correct of those two 
species of attention, even without a further account of executive attention. Indeed, the 
NPA view has a plausible unified treatment of endogenous and exogenous attention: 
it may treat attention capture as the passive acquisition of the relevant non-
propositional attitude, and treat actively paying attention to something as the activity 
of maintaining that non-propositional attitude.1 A shift of attention (like when the 
subject shifts her auditory attention from one instrument to another) would be treated 
as a change in the non-propositional attitude: first our subject is bearing the non-
propositional attitude to, say, the sound of a piano, and then she is bearing it to the 
sound of a saxophone. 
In the first half of this paper, I will provide arguments that make the NPA view 
attractive, and provide some details with regard to how the NPA view may be 
developed.  
In the end, though, I believe that the NPA view is not fully successful. In the second 
half of the paper, I will argue that the NPA view faces problems that push towards a 
related, but interestingly different account of the nature of attention that I have 
defended in detail elsewhere (Watzl 2017). While it is true that attention is almost 
always non-propositional and almost always intentionally directed, it is not an 
intentional attitude. Rather, it is constituted by an almost always non-propositional 
structure of mostly intentional states. So, while the NPA view has much to speak for 
it, we should reject it in favor of the following: 
The Non-Propositional Structure View Attention is or is constituted by an 
irreducibly non-propositional mental structure. 
The NPS view agrees with the NPA view that attention is (often) intentional and non-
propositional. But it says that attention most fundamentally it is not a mental attitude. 
Instead, attention is constituted by a non-propositional structure of the intentional 
mind. In other respects, the NPS view shares much with the NPA view: it would treat 
attention capture, for example, as the passive acquisition of the relevant mental 
structure, actively paying attention to something as the activity of maintaining that 
mental structure, and attention shifts as changes in the mental structure.   
                                                
1 This is idea is inspired by Soteriou’s treatment of noticing and watching (Soteriou 2012).  
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Here, then, is how I will proceed. Section 1 contains preliminaries that, on the one 
hand, motivate the rest of the paper, and, on the other hand, defend an important 
presupposition of the following discussion. Section 2 is devoted to the arguments for 
the NPA view and to a discussion of how such a view might be developed. Section 3 
raises some problems for the NPA view, and argues that these problems point in the 
direction of the NPS view as an alternative. I will briefly sketch the alternative, how it 
solves the problems raised, and some of its consequences. I end with a brief 
conclusion in Section 4. 
1 Preliminaries 
1.1 The mind: bundle or structure of attitudes? 
Suppose you do not specifically care about attention (thanks for making it this far!). 
You do care, though, about the intentional structure of the mind. In this section, I 
provide two reasons for reading this paper.  
First, the investigation of the NPA view and its comparison to the NPS view is 
relevant to whether intentionalism is true about the mind. According to 
intentionalism, as I will understand it, all mental phenomena are reducible to 
intentional phenomena.2  
What is an intentional phenomenon? A plausible and common understanding is to 
think of it as a subject’s bearing of an intentional attitude toward an intentional 
content and/or an intentional object. Paradigms of such intentional attitudes are a 
subject’s judging that grass is green or her desiring a cup of coffee. Here judging and 
desiring are the relevant attitudes, the proposition that grass is green is an intentional 
content, and the cup of coffee is an intentional object. 
When, then, is a mental phenomenon reducible to such intentional attitudes? We can 
distinguish strong reducibility and weak reducibility.  
If every mental phenomenon is strongly reducible to intentional phenomena, then 
every mental phenomenon is fully explained by the various intentional attitudes a 
subject bears towards intentional contents and objects. Strong intentionalism is 
committed to what may be called a bundle of attitudes picture about the mind: there is 
nothing more to an individual’s mentality than her intentional attitudes. A subject’s 
mind is just a collection or bundle of her attitudes, so that a comprehensive account of 
her mental life at any given time is provided by listing those attitudes.  
By contrast, weak reducibility allows that some mental phenomena are only partially 
explained by the various intentional attitudes a subject bears towards intentional 
contents and objects. On this view, while intentional attitudes figure in every 
                                                
2 E.g. Crane 1998.  
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explanation of a mental phenomenon, they do not exhaust this explanation. According 
to weak intentionalism, there can be no mentality without intentionality, and yet there 
is more to an individual’s mentality than her intentional attitudes. As an instance of 
weak intentionalism that will concern us here, consider an organization of attitudes 
picture. On this model, a subject’s mind consists of all of her intentional attitudes plus 
a structure that organizes those attitudes (the way the parts of her mind are put 
together). The structure cannot exist without intentional attitudes that fill the 
structure, so there can be no mind without intentional attitudes. But there is more to 
an individual mind than her intentional attitudes, since the organizing structure is not 
itself an intentional attitude. 
Given that attention seems to be a mental phenomenon, intentionalism has to show 
that attention is reducible to intentional attitudes. Strong intentionalism entails that 
attention either is itself an intentional attitude or that it can be fully explained in terms 
of other such intentional attitudes. Given that – as I will argue – attention cannot be 
fully explained in terms of other propositional attitudes, the NPA view thus is the 
best bet for how strong intentionalism could accommodate attention. Since that 
accommodation fails, I argue, we have to reject strong intentionalism and settle for at 
best weak intentionalism: in order to explain attention, we need a structure of the 
mind that goes beyond attitudes and intentional contents and objects. The NPS view 
is compatible with weak intentionalism but not with strong intentionalism. 
As a second point of interest, consider that the investigation of the NPA view and its 
comparison to the NPS view is relevant for whether propositionalism is true.  
According to propositionalism all intentional phenomena either are or are reducible to 
propositional attitudes. 
If propositionalism were true, then desiring a cup of coffee, for example, while on the 
surface not seeming to have propositional content could still be fully explained in 
terms of propositional attitudes. The same goes for fear of spiders or searching for the 
Fountain of Youth.  
While propositionalism recently has been much criticized (see e.g. Montague 2007;  
Grzankowski 2012, 2013; Crane 2014) the case remains controversial. Sinhababu 
(2014), for example, argues that propositionalism can account for the cases of alleged 
non-propositional attitudes that are discussed in the literature. If the NPA view could 
be substantiated, then opponents of propositionalism would have a new case to appeal 
to (critics like Sinhababu, after all, do not discuss attention). In contrast to the NPA 
view, though, the NPS view is compatible with propositionalism. Given that attention 
is not an attitude, its non-propositional character is compatible with the claim that all 
intentional attitudes are propositional attitudes. 
My defense of the NPS view over the NPA view thus amounts to a partial defense of 
propositionalism, against the challenge coming from attention specifically. Indeed, 
insofar as it is plausible that other apparently non-propositional attitudes like desiring 
a cup of coffee, fearing spiders or searching for the Fountain of Youth can be 
explained in terms of propositional attitudes and characteristic patterns of attention 
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that highlight or make salient the relevant intentional objects,3 the NPS view indeed 
may be used as a starting point for a defense of propositionalism on a broader front. 
On the resulting picture, all attitudes would be propositional attitudes, but the mind 
would – in addition – have a non-propositional, and non-attitudinal structure. The 
defense of the NPS view thus can function as a resource in a defense of 
propositionalism – if combined with only weak intentionalism. 
1.2 We should treat attention like perception, thought, and desire 
The discussion of this paper presupposes that attention is a mental phenomenon in the 
sense that is at issue in discussions of intentionalism or propositionalism. Some might 
question whether this presupposition is justified. Isn’t attention a computational or 
neuronal mechanism, and hence a topic best left to neuroscientific and psychological 
study? Few would find a discussion of edge detection mechanisms or working 
memory pertinent with regard to propositionalism, so why should we discuss 
attention? 
This objection, though, is misguided. There is no good reason to treat attention 
differently than, for example, perception, thought, fear, hope and desire. If – and this 
is indeed an assumption of this paper – we can make progress toward understanding 
perception, desire or emotion by asking whether they are, for example, non-
propositional attitudes, it would be surprising if the relevant philosophical tools 
became toothless when applied to attention. Attention is similar to phenomena like 
perception, desire or emotion at least in the following four ways. 
First, attention, unlike edge detection or working memory, is an important aspect of 
what is often called folk-psychology: an important aspect of how we experience, think 
and talk about the mind outside the scientific laboratory. Indeed, already infants are 
extremely sensitive to whether their caregivers pay attention to them, and react 
differentially to attentive engagement. “The attention of others,” suggests 
developmental psychologist Vasu Reddy (2008, p. 90), “is probably the first, 
simplest, and most powerful experience that we have of mentality.” And according to 
Susan Carey, a rudimentary conception of attention may indeed be a part of innate 
core knowledge regarding mentality, at least developmentally more fundamental than 
conceptions of belief or desire.4  
Second, attention is also an important aspect of the intuitive conception we have of 
our own mentality.  As William James (1890/1981, p. 424) famously put it: “Every 
one knows what attention is. … Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of 
its essence.” Attention is an important part of our conscious experience: there often is 
something it is like to focus attention on something. We thus know something about 
attention in roughly the same way we know about perception, emotion or desire, by 
                                                
3 While the details of such views remain to be developed, the development could, for example, draw on 
Scanlon’s (1998) ‘desires in the directed-attention sense’ or ideas in Railton 2010. 
4 Carey 2010, Ch. 5, p. 157ff 
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phenomenological reflection on our own experience. Whether or not attention is 
essentially conscious, we get some initial grip on the phenomenon from the way it 
shapes our experience.5  
Third, attention is an “inner” form of mentality just like perception, emotion or desire. 
While attention – like the latter – sometimes has a characteristic bodily expression, we 
often deploy attention without a characteristic overt expression.6 A subject may focus 
her auditory attention on one instrument in an orchestra or on one aspect of the music 
without any overt bodily signs. The same is true for visual attention. We may shift 
attention to something without a movement of the eyeball,7 and we may focus 
attention on one feature (like color) rather than another (like shape) without a 
difference in bodily posture. 
Fourth, just like the nature of desire or belief is unlikely to be found in a specific 
aspect of neuronal or computational processing, the nature of attention can probably 
not be found on that level either. On the level of such processing, we find a diverse 
variety of processes and properties, and not a unified neuronal or computational kind 
with which attention could be reductively identified. Attention – like perception, 
desire or emotion – appears to be a subject level mental phenomenon, without a 
reductive nature.8  
To sum up: attention is characterized by the following features. It is part of folk-
psychology, an aspect of conscious experience, intuitively “inner”, and without an 
easy reductive identification. While a detailed defense of these claims would need 
more space (see Watzl 2017), I take the presumption to be vindicated that attention is 
a mental phenomenon in the same sense as perception, fear, hope, and desire.  
2 Attention as a non-propositional intentional attitude 
2.1 Attention is intentional 
According to the NPA view, attention is a non-propositional intentional attitude. In 
the next two sections, I will argue that attention is indeed intentional, and that it is 
non-propositional. This seems to support the NPA view. Let us start with the 
intentional character of attention. 
                                                
5 Recent evidence strongly suggests that attention is not essentially conscious. See Kentridge (2011) 
for a fairly recent overview. 
6 Psychologists routinely distinguish between overt (i.e. bodily expressed) forms of attention, and 
covert forms of attention (see e.g. Wright and Ward 2008 for a review). 
7 Wright and Ward 2008 for a detailed review of covert visual attention shifts.  
8 See Watzl (2017, Ch. 1). Note that I do not claim that attention has no reductive explanation. I am 
only claiming that any reductive explanation of attention is likely to be as complex as a reductive 
explanation of perception, thought or desire. Skepticism toward an understanding of mentality in such 
terms as “content”, “attitude”, or “intentionality” should not be directed to attention alone. 
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The concept of intentionality is often introduced with reference to Brentano’s idea of 
“the mind’s direction toward an object”,9 or his idea that certain mental phenomena 
are such that they include “something as an object within itself.”10 Call this the 
intuitive conception of intentionality. In order to give the reader a grip on the idea of 
intentionality a number of paradigms are often considered, such as thinking about 
something, desiring something, looking at something or listening to something.  
Attentional phenomena are included within those paradigms: directing attention to 
something and having one’s attention captured by something are paradigms of the 
idea that the mind is directed toward an object or includes an object (the object of 
attention) within itself. “Attending and perceiving are […] paradigmatic intentional 
relations”, Susan Carey (2011, p. 158), for example, observes. It is thus hard to think 
of an argument for why attention should be understood as an intentional 
phenomenon, when intentionality is conceived of by reference to Brentano’s idea. 
Attention seems to be one of a range of phenomena that help to fix the referent of the 
technical notion of intentionality.  
Consider also the phenomenological observation according to which those with an 
intentional life have a perspective or point of view on the world. Call this the 
phenomenological conception of intentionality.11 Here is how Tim Crane (2001) 
expresses this idea. 
What the daffodil lacks and the ‘minded’ creature has is a point of 
view on things or […] a perspective. We might express this by saying 
that a minded creature is one which has a world: its world. 
Attention is intimately connected to the idea of a point of view or perspective on the 
world. By describing how a subject attends we seem to describe the subject’s 
perspective or point of view. In William James’s (1890/1981, p. 424) words: “each of 
us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of a universe he 
shall appear to himself to inhabit.” Consider, for example, how intuitive it is to think 
about differences in attention when we think about differences in subjective 
perspectives. In her popular science book The Philosophical Baby (2010), 
developmental psychologist Alison Gopnik illustrates differences in the subjective 
perspectives of babies and adults by describing differences in the ways they attend. 
While the perspective of adults is often narrow and focused (their attention takes the 
form of a narrow spotlight), the perspective of babies is wide and open (their attention 
is distributed and takes the form of a lantern that illuminates everything at once). 
Attention, thus, seems clearly intentional also in the sense that is intimately connected 
to having a subjective perspective or point of view on the world.  
                                                
9 Brentano 2014 
10 Ibid.  
11 Crane 1998. 
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Finally, consider that intentional states are often thought to play a distinctive role in 
the explanation of agency. A person’s intentional states are those states that explain 
her actions in a rational or sense-making way. Call this the pragmatic conception of 
intentionality. Robert Stalnaker (1984) expresses the view as follows. 
Representational [= intentional]12 mental states should be understood 
primarily in terms of the role that they play in the characterization and 
explanation of action. What is essential to rational action is that the 
agent be confronted, or conceive of himself as confronted, with a 
range of alternative possible outcomes of some alternative possible 
actions. The agent has attitudes, pro and con, toward the different 
possible outcomes, and beliefs about the contribution which the 
alternative actions would make to determining the outcome. One 
explains why an agent tends to act in the way he does in terms of such 
beliefs and attitudes. And, according to this picture, our conceptions of 
belief and of attitudes pro and con are conceptions of states which 
explain why a rational agent does what he does. Some representational 
mental states—for example, idle wishes, passive hopes, and theoretical 
beliefs—may be connected only very indirectly with action, but all 
must be explained, according to the pragmatic picture, in terms of their 
connections with the explanation of rational action. 
Does attention play a role in the explanation of rational action? While much work in 
the philosophy of action has had no room for attention, in a recent series of writings 
Wayne Wu (2008, 2011a,b, 2014) has argued that there is such a role. I believe that 
Wu is correct in identifying a crucial role of attention in the explanation of rational 
action.13 
The rough idea, in my version of Wu’s crucial insight, is that it is characteristic of 
rational action, as opposed to mere reflex, that the agent is confronted with many 
perceptual inputs (a complex scene) and many possible behavioral outputs (she can 
act flexibly). Wu calls this the Many-Many Problem. Intentional (or rational) action, 
Wu writes, “requires a solution to the Many-Many Problem by selection of a specific 
linkage between input and output” (2008, p. 50). Attention is directly involved in the 
solution. In the complex way the agent represents the world, attention prioritizes 
some aspects, to which she then couples her behavioral response. Attention, thus 
plays a critical role in the rational explanation of action: it prioritizes aspects of the 
way the map by which the agent steers represents the world for her behavior in that 
world. By doing so, attention is essential for guiding the agent’s behavior through her 
environment in the way that is characteristic of rational action (this is so exactly 
because, in Stalnaker’s terms, intentional agents conceive of themselves as being 
confronted with a range of possible actions in light of how they take the world to be). 
Neither her standing beliefs and desires, her long-term intentions, nor her perceptual 
                                                
12 Stalnaker (p. 2) explicitly identifies representational and intentional states.  
13 I disagree with Wu’s claim that attention is selection for action (see Watzl 2017, Ch. 5). 
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experience would be enough to determine a specific action in an agent’s concrete 
situation. In many cases, at least, the agent needs to prioritize some aspects of what 
she is confronted with over others. And this is exactly what attention delivers.14  
Attention thus is intentional on the intuitive, the phenomenological and on the 
pragmatic conception of intentionality. It is hard to deny that attention is an 
intentional phenomenon (as we will see below, though, that is true, only in the weak 
sense of intentionalism). 
2.2 Attention is non-propositional 
Assuming that attention is intentional, is it a propositional intentional attitude? If it 
were, then attention would have propositional content. As a first indication of whether 
attention has propositional content, we can consider whether it is linguistically picked 
out by an ‘A-ing that p’ ascription, where ‘that p’ is taken as the canonical way of 
referring to a propositional content. 
Both endogenous attending as well as attention capture are ascribed by relational 
predicates. We can focus attention on, and have our attention captured by, a variety of 
different entities. These include the following.15 
• Material objects: “attending to this glass.” 
• Locations in the environment or on the body: “attending to this location.” 
• Events: “attending to this sound or this flash.” 
• Processes: “attending to the leaves’ rustling, on the light’s flickering.” 
• Properties/Features/Qualities: “attending to the color, or the shape.” 
• Facts: “attending to the fact that this is red/square/absent.” “His attention was 
caught by the fact that this is red/square/absent.” 
                                                
14 Watzl 2017 for more on my own take on the connection between attention and agency. Jennings and 
Nanay (2014) provide an argument to the effect that some (non-paradigmatic) forms of agency might 
not require attention. This targets Wu’s claim that attention is essential to agency. It does not target the 
present claim. To be an intentional phenomenon, according to the pragmatic picture, does not require 
that the relevant phenomenon is essential for the rationalizing explanation of all actions (emotion, 
perception or even conscious thought are not involved in all actions either). The picture only requires 
that an intentional phenomenon is essentially involved in a rationalizing explanation of some (or 
maybe a large and important enough class of) intentional actions.  
15 I provide examples of attending to something. Most of these work for attention capture as well 
(though, interestingly, while it seems that we can focus attention on a location, it seems that locations 
cannot capture our attention). Note also that while I here introduce these examples intuitively, 
examples like these can also be found in any textbook on attention (e.g. Wright and Ward 2008). 
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None of the attentional constructions directly take that-clauses.16 All of the following 
are misformed: 
(*7a) She focuses attention on that p. 
(*7b) She directs attention to that p. 
(*7c) She pays attention to that p. 
(*7d) Her attention was captured by that p. 
Most attentional constructions, thus, do not appear to be propositional attitude 
constructions. While facts (which are, arguably, structured like propositions) are 
indeed among the objects of our attention, most objects of attention are not facts. 
Further, attention to locations, objects, events, and the like cannot be reduced to 
attention to facts in any straightforward way: it is one thing to focus attention on a 
glass in front of you, but a different thing to focus attention on the fact that there is a 
glass in front of you. The first is normally a perceptual act, while the second rather 
seems to be an intellectual act where you contemplate a certain fact for, say, the 
purpose of philosophical discussion. Thus, even if attending to the fact that p could be 
treated as a propositional attitude, most cases of attending are not cases of attending 
to facts (for comparison, consider that among the things people like are some facts, as 
well as cups of coffee and other objects. Liking would not be a propositional attitude 
simply because sometimes people like facts – or indeed propositions). 
Linguistically, most cases of attention, thus, are not picked out by A-ing that p 
constructions. This is a first indication that attention is probably not a propositional 
attitude.  
But a proponent of a propositional view of attention need not give up so easily. Let us 
consider a version of the propositional view according to which there is nothing more 
to attention than the bearing of propositional attitudes – even though attention might 
not have the surface structure of a propositional attitude (cf. Tye 2010, p. 429). We 
have the following position: 
The Propositional View For each instance of attending to x (or having one’s 
attention captured by x), there are some propositional attitudes A1…AN and 
propositions p1… pN such that attending to x (or having one’s attention captured 
by x) just is bearing A1 to p1, A2 to p2, …, and AN to pN.  
                                                
16 In some other languages attention constructions do take that clauses (thanks to Anders Nes for 
pointing me to this fact). Consider German: “Fritz lenkte/richtete seine Aufmerksamkeit darauf, dass er 
dieses Glas in Rom gekauft hatte.” [Fritz directed/focused his attention on/to that he had bought this 
glass in Rome.] Similar expressions occur in the Scandinavian languages.  Several other languages 
seem to be like that too (e.g. Hebrew). To my knowledge, though, in none of these languages do 
attention constructions only take that clauses. Further, at least in German the that clause constructions 
are relatively rare. Search in an important corpus of written German (Archiv der geschriebenen 
Sprache “Alle öffentlichen Korpora” available here http://www.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2/web-app/, 
containing 1.5 Billion words) reveals that “Aufmerksam(keit) darauf, dass” constructions account for 
less than 0.2 % of the occurrences of “Aufmerksam(keit)”. 
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While I believe that the propositional view is false, it should not be dismissed out of 
hand. Aside from the general appeal of propositionalism about intentionality, it has at 
least the following two attractions – which also indicate how the propositional view 
may be best developed. 
First, a proponent of the propositional view could wholeheartedly endorse the 
observation that attention is not picked out by propositional attitude ascriptions. The 
propositional view of attention, she might argue, should not be defended by treating 
attention as a specific attitude the subject might bear to any number of propositions, 
but rather by treating attention in terms of representing specific propositions. 
Auditory attention to a sound, for example, should be treated as the perceptual 
representation of specific propositions about that sound. Maybe the sound is 
perceptually represented as (in a context specific way) interesting, important or 
salient. Cognitive attention to an idea on a similar model would be treated in terms of 
thoughts that this idea is (in a context specific way) interesting, important, or salient.  
This treatment of attention is plausible in light of the dependent character of attention 
(to which I will return later. See also Watzl 2017, Ch. 4). That is: it seems highly 
plausibly that one cannot just attend to something. What a subject focuses her 
attention on (or what captures her attention) must always be present to her mind in 
some way or other. She either must perceive that object, think about the object, 
imagine the object, desire it, etc. In general, it is plausible that if a subject S attends to 
o, then, necessarily, S bears some other intentional attitude to o. If attention is indeed 
dependent on other aspects of mentality in this way, then it might seem highly 
plausible that attending to an already represented object consists in representing the 
object is some specific way. The proponent of the propositional view would only 
need to find out what that particular way is. The dependent character of attention, 
thus, suggests that the propositional view is best developed in terms of attention 
specific propositions, rather than attention specific attitudes. 
Second, we can see a specific advantage of the way of treating attention suggested in 
the last paragraph, by considering that sometimes a subject’s attention seems to be 
engaged by something that does not exist (we will re-consider this idea later). Think 
of Macbeth whose mind is drawn to what appears to him to be a dagger there before 
him. It keeps his attention; he is obsessing about it, while he wonders what “it” may 
be: “Is this a dagger”, he asks, “which I see before me … or art thou but a dagger of 
the mind, a false creation, proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?” While 
Macbeth is unsure of the ontological category of what captures his attention surely his 
attention was engaged by something (why else would he be so distracted?). While a 
hallucinating subject thus arguably does not see anything or hear anything (she only 
seems to see something or seems to hear something), it is hard to deny that she is 
actually attending to something, or that her attention is actually captured: he does not 
just seem to attend to something or her attention does not just appear to be captured. 
The second advantage of the propositional view then is that it has a straightforward 
explanation of attention in hallucination: the hallucinating subject who attends to 
some element in the hallucinated scene represents that element in a particular way. 
Think of Macbeth’s hallucinatory experience as the representation of a false 
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proposition (e.g. that there is a dagger in front of him). If the propositional view were 
true, then his attending to “the dagger” would consist in the representation of further 
(plausibly also false) propositions, e.g. that there is a dagger in from of him and that it 
is important or salient. No extraordinary ontological commitments, or other oddities, 
would follow from the fact that there is something to which the hallucinating subject 
attends, if the fact that there is something to which she attends just is the fact that she 
bears certain propositional attitudes toward certain contents. 
Yet, while a propositional view has these advantages, I believe that it must be 
rejected. It faces the following serious problems. 
First, the propositional view yields artificial accuracy conditions. Any propositional 
content determines conditions for how the world must be. These are the accuracy 
conditions for an attitude with that propositional content. A belief that grass is green, 
for example, is accurate only if grass is green. So, if attention just is the bearing of 
attitudes A1… AN to propositions p1 … pN, we can ask whether the world actually is 
the way A1… AN represent it to be.  
Suppose, for example, that perceptually attending to some object o just is to have a 
perceptual representation that represents o as more important, interesting, or salient 
than other objects. Now we can ask: is o in fact more important, more interesting, or 
more salient than those other objects? But this question seems misguided. It doesn’t 
seem to be the function of attention to describe the world as being a particular way, 
and so the imposition of accuracy conditions on attention appears misguided. Note 
that this observation stands even if – quite plausibly – one accepts that there is a 
normative failure (things are not as they ought to be) when a subject attends to 
something that is uninteresting and unimportant for her even at that moment – 
whether because it captures her attention like the neighbor’s loud music or because 
her mind was wandering. It is true that in those cases, her attention isn’t where it 
ought to be. But this does not mean that her attention is inaccurate with respect to her 
environment. Unlike in the case of perception where talk of accuracy and inaccuracy 
is easy to get a grip, in the case of attention the normative failure, if there is one, 
seems to be prudential impropriety and not inaccuracy. 
Of course, with some ingenuity one may associate attention with propositional 
contents that cannot be inaccurate: one might, for example, suggest that the attended 
object is represented as attended or as attentionally prominent. If attention represented 
response-dependent properties of the right kind, then – maybe – attention could never 
be inaccurate. Yet, such a move is ad hoc and artificial. While color perception 
clearly seems phenomenally to represent a property instantiated by the surfaces of 
objects (even if, in the end, colors are response-dependent properties), attention does 
not seem to represent a property of the objects it is directed towards. It just doesn’t 
seem to make sense to ask whether things are as they are represented to be in our 
attention. This illustrates that the introduction of accuracy conditions for attention, 
which every propositional view implies, is indeed artificial. 
Second, while there can be no reasonable doubt that attention affects which 
propositions a subject entertains, it would be a mistake to identify attention with these 
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effects, since for all propositions it is plausible that a subject may entertain these 
propositions even without attention. Any effect of attention on the content of 
perceptual experience for example can be replicated even without attention. Consider, 
to start, the representation of an object as interesting, important or salient. A subject 
can clearly represent contents about an object of this type without attending to the 
object. You might believe that your keys are very important and yet – through a slip 
of the mind – pay no attention to them when leaving the house. And you might know 
that something is a salient meeting place, while it fails to capture your attention. The 
same holds for other content types one might associate with attention. Consider the 
idea that visual attention to an object consists in a relatively specific or determinate 
visual representation of that object (Nanay 2011, Stazicker 2011). Objects at the 
fovea of the eye (the part of the eye with highest resolution) are also represented with 
a relatively high specificity or determinacy, even when the subject’s visual attention 
has covertly shifted away from the fovea. And so, visual attention to an object cannot 
consist in a relatively specific or determinate visual representation of that object.  
In response someone might suggest that I may not have considered the right 
propositions: maybe there is a specific type of importance or a specific type of 
determinacy distribution that cannot be represented without attention? But the 
argument generalizes for principled reasons: if attention does not consist in a specific 
intentional attitude, but in the entertaining of a specific set of proposition p1 … pN (as 
the view under consideration claims), then p1 … pN cannot make (implicit) reference 
to an attention attitude (since there is no such attitude). Now either p1 … pN specify 
how things stand in the world aside from the subject who entertains those 
propositions, or they specify how things stand with the subject herself. But it is 
implausible that p1 … pN  specify how things stand with the subject herself, since, for 
example, having one’s attention captured by an explosion does consists in 
representing how things stand with oneself. But if attention were essential to 
entertaining propositions p1 … pN about how things stand in the world aside from the 
subject (without making reference to an attention attitude), then the subject’s attention 
would have to be essential to how things stand in the world aside from the subject. 
And that is highly implausible (a subject’s attention puts no constraints on how the 
world aside from her must be).17 
Third, even if the last two objections fail, given the large variety of ways a subject’s 
attention might be engaged and the large variety of potential objects of attention, it 
appears to be an uphill battle to find any particular set of attitudes and propositions 
such that any form of attention consists in the bearing of these attitudes to those 
propositions. It will be difficult for the propositional view to explain what a subject 
whose attention is caught by a loud sound outside, a subject who focuses her visual 
attention on a grey square, a subject who pays attention to an idea in contemplation, 
and a subject whose attention wanders again and again to her boss fueling with anger 
at him, have in common. While there appears to be something in common between all 
those cases of attention, the similarity does not appear to consist in a specific way of 
representing the world. While visual attention to the square plausible represents that 
                                                
17 For a related and more developed argument see Watzl (2017, Ch. 8). 
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square with higher spatial resolution and determinacy nothing like such effects on 
resolution are present in the anger case or the case of contemplative attention. 
Similarly, for importance and significance for action. The propositional view, thus, 
cannot make sense of any sense in which attention is a unified phenomenon: it will 
turn out to be highly disjunctive. 
In light of these three difficulties, I conclude that the propositional view fails. Let us 
also note, though, that the involvement of attention in hallucination and the dependent 
character of attention made the view plausible. We will return to those issues in the 
second half of the paper. 
2.3 How to develop the non-propositional attitude view 
So far, we have seen reasons to think that attention is intentional, and reasons to 
believe that it cannot be explained in terms of propositional attitudes. Together these 
two considerations appear to provide a powerful case in support of the view that 
attention is a non-propositional, intentional attitude, i.e. the NPA view. This view 
then takes seriously the surface structure of the attention constructions and takes 
attention to have the logical form ‘S As o’, where S is the subject, A is the non-
propositional attitude, and o is the intentional object. In this section, I will note some 
features that the relevant non-propositional attitude should have (which distinguishes 
it from some non-propositional attitudes, though it arguably shares it with others). 
First, some other proposed non-propositional attitudes such as fearing something, 
searching for something, or desiring something can clearly be intentionally directed at 
non-existent objects. A child might tremble with fear of ghosts in the castle she is 
visiting, even though there are no ghosts in that castle. Ponce de Léon might search 
for the Fountain of Youth even though this Fountain does not exist. And you might 
want ice cream that isn’t cold (because the cold ice cream always hurts your teeth) 
even though sadly such ice cream does not exist (and maybe is impossible). While, of 
course, a theoretically satisfactory treatment of such merely intentional objects is not 
easy, it is highly intuitive that the existence of something does not follow from the 
fact that people fear it, search for it or want it. 
By contrast, attention intuitively does imply that there exists something to which the 
subject attends. The child’s attention cannot be directed toward the ghost she is afraid 
of, given that there is no such ghost. “It” cannot capture her attention and keep her 
from sleeping. There may, of course, be something that does capture her attention (the 
rustling of the wind and the other strange sounds of the nightly castle) and that she 
mistakes from a ghost. But it is not the ghost. Similarly, while Ponce de Léon’s 
attention may return time and again to the idea of and the image of the Fountain he is 
searching, it cannot be directed at the Fountain, for there is no such fountain. And 
while you might think a lot about warm ice cream, for example about whether it is at 
least metaphysically possible, that ice cream, it seems, given its non-existence cannot 
be the object of your attention. Finally, while – as I have mentioned – its seems 
highly plausible that Macbeth’s attention is engaged by his hallucination, he cannot 
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focus is attention on the dagger there before him, for there is no such dagger. It is thus 
highly plausible that if attention is a non-propositional attitude, then – unlike fear, 
hope, search and desire – it is existence implying in the following sense: if S attends 
to o (or if S’s attention is captured by o), then there exists something to which S 
attends (or something that captures S’s attention). Call this Existence Implication.  
Some might be inclined to think that existence implication is incompatible with 
intentionality. For are not intentional attitudes exactly those phenomena that leave 
open whether their objects exist? 
But existence implication is compatible with intentionality. Consider that we cannot 
conclude from that fact that knowing that p is factive that knowledge is not an 
intentional mental state.18 From the fact that some propositional attitudes may have 
false propositions as their content, it does not follow that all propositional attitudes 
can have false propositions as content. Similarly, from the fact that some non-
propositional intentional attitudes can be directed at non-existent objects (such as 
fearing or liking) it does not follow that all non-propositional intentional attitudes can 
be directed at non-existent objects. Attention seems to be in the same class as seeing 
or hearing something, knowing something or remembering something. All of these 
require that there exists something that the subject sees or hears, knows or remembers 
it. It just does not follow from this that these phenomena are not intentional. 
Second, many proposed non-propositional attitudes are directed at their intentional 
objects under some mode of presentation or under some perspective. Consider that it 
doesn’t follow from the fact that Lois Lane is searching for Superman it she is also 
searching for Clark Kent, even though Superman is identical to Clark Kent (she may 
know perfectly well where Clark is). And she might love Superman, while there is a 
clear sense in which she does not love Clark, whom she thinks to be rather clumsy 
and dull. Many non-propositional attitudes consequently are picked out linguistically 
by so-called intensional transitive verb phrases, which create referentially opaque 
contexts, so that it does not follow from that fact that someone As x that she also As y, 
even though x = y. Plausibly, that is because the relevant attitudes themselves present 
their object under some mode of presentation. 
By contrast, it is plausible that, as Tye (2010, p. 429) observes, that “necessarily, if I 
attend to a and a is the same as b, then I attend to b.” For example, if the detective 
who arrives at the crime scene focuses her attention on a red spot on the wall, which 
she believes to be a blood stain caused by a murder, then she focuses her attention on 
a piece of jam caused by the victim’s last breakfast, even though she mistakenly does 
not take the red spot to be a piece of jam. Similarly, if Lois Lane’s attention is 
captured by Superman’s arrival then it is captured by Clark’s arrival, even though 
Lois has no idea that Clark is the same as Superman. For this reason, it seems that a 
non-propositional attention attitude would not present its object under some mode of 
presentation. In this rather strong sense, it would seem to be non-conceptual. 
                                                
18 Williamson 2000. 
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Against Tye’s observation of the non-conceptual character of attention, one might 
bring up cases where subjects attend to an object only qua X and not qua Y, which 
may suggest that at least sometimes attention is directed at something only under one 
mode of presentation. Consider that a young naturalist explorer at the zoo might focus 
his attention directly on the leg of a stick insect, but not qua leg, but qua its branch-
like appearance. Only later does the leg qua leg capture his attention. Similarly, he 
might pay attention to a specific tree that he doesn’t recognize to be a pine tree, but 
later that tree captures his attention qua pine tree (see Siegel 2010 for related 
discussion of such examples). Sometimes attention under one aspect rather than 
another may make an important difference. When the children in Mischel’s 
Marshmallow experiment focused on the Marshmallow qua cloud-shaped white 
object they were able to delay gratification for much longer than when they focused 
on the Marshmallow qua yummy edible treat (see Mischel 2014 for a review). Or 
consider the difference between attending (in thought and emotion) to someone as a 
locus of intrinsic dignity and worth versus focusing on the same person as an object 
to be exploited (see Murdoch 1971). 
But the non-conceptual character of attention is compatible with these observations. 
Cases like the stick insect, the pine tree, and the Marshmallow can be treated by 
drawing more fine-grained distinctions in the objects of the subject’s attention, what 
she attends to, without introducing modes of presentation. Attention, of course, can be 
directed at material objects, but it can also, and often at the same time, be directed at 
features. The different children in Mischel’s experiments focused on different 
features of the Marshmallow: some focused at its affective qualities (and 
consequently, delay of gratification time was short), and some focused at its shape 
(here the delay of gratification time was much longer). And what did not capture our 
young naturalist’s attention at first was a feature of the object in front him, i.e. it’s 
being a leg. Similarly, for the feature of being a pine tree. Concepts and recognitional 
capacities can also function as input to attention – as attentional tuning devices, as it 
were: a specific tree (the object) might capture your attention only because you 
recognize it to be a pine tree. This need not imply that attention itself presents objects 
under modes of presentation. Some of the other cases need a different treatment: to 
attend to someone qua locus of intrinsic dignity does not mean that you attend to her 
dignity: you attend to the person not to a feature of her. Those cases are best treated, 
by distinguishing different ways of attending, different species of the relevant non-
propositional attitude. We need such species in any case in order to distinguish, say, 
our detective’s visual attention to red spot from tactile attention to that spot (by 
touching it) or intellectual attention to it (by thinking about it). Arguably then to 
attend to someone qua object of intrinsic worth and dignity is best accounted for as a 
specific way of attending to her (which plausibly involves your affective and moral 
attitudes in specific ways).  
Overall, then, it seems that the NPA view would be best developed by treating 
attention as (a) existence implying, (b) non-conceptual, and (c) coming in a number 
of types or species.  
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3 Attention as a non-propositional structure 
3.1 The Hallucination Problem 
So far, all may seem well and good with the NPA view. Yet, I will now pose two 
problems for the view that together, I believe, undermine its plausibility (they suggest 
that attention is at least most fundamentally not an mental attitude). Both stem from 
observations I have already made.  
The first problem concerns the role of attention in hallucination. 
When I motivated the, in the end rejected, propositional view of attention I suggested 
that it is highly plausible that a hallucinating subject’s attention may be genuinely 
engaged. Macbeth does not just seem to attend, he is attending. Otherwise, for 
example, it is hard to explain why he is distracted by his hallucination. The claim that 
there sometimes is perceptual attention in hallucination thus is highly plausible. Call 
this Hallucinatory Attention. The problem is how to combine hallucinatory attention 
with Existence Implication, i.e. the claim that if a subject attends to o, then there 
exists something to which she attends.  
A proponent of the NPA view can either deny hallucinatory attention, deny existence 
implication, or find a plausible way of combining them.  
Consider denying hallucinatory attention. Pautz (2010), for example, suggests that we 
speak of quasi-attending in such cases and model them after the more well known 
quasi-remembering in cases of inaccurate memory. Just like we cannot remember an 
event that has not happened, we cannot attend to something that does not exist. But 
we can quasi-remember a non-existing event, where quasi-remembering is like 
remembering but without existence implication. Similarly, Macbeth cannot attend to 
the non-existing dagger, but he can quasi-attend to it.  
But there are crucial dis-analogies here. Quasi-remembering a past event is plausibly 
exhausted by a memory-like representation as of a past event of the relevant type. The 
subject’s memory state represents the world as having been some way, and the world 
was not that way. It inaccurately represents the past. But if the arguments against the 
propositional view of attention are correct, then attention does not represent the world 
as being some way, and we therefore cannot treat quasi-attention as an attention-like 
way of inaccurately representing the world around the subject. But, as we have seen, 
it also seems not plausible to treat quasi-attending as merely seeming to attend to 
something.  
Consider the following vignette for illustration. Suppose a patient suffers from 
chronic tinnitus. She appears to hear a high pitch sound. Let us further suppose that 
her experience is subjectively indistinguishable from hearing an actual sound in her 
environment, and that there is no such sound in her environment. The patient comes 
to her doctor with the following (indeed quite typical) problem: 
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Tinnitus Patient:  Doctor, this sound really distracts me; it captures my 
attention all the time. I can’t concentrate on anything else. How can 
you help me? 
Here is how a doctor may respond: 
Doctor X: There is no sound. It seems to you as if there is a sound, but 
there actually is none.  It only seems to you as if you hear something. 
What captures your attention is just an illusion created by your brain. 
Here, though, is how the doctor arguably cannot respond: 
* Doctor Y: There is no sound. It seems to you as if there is a sound, 
but there actually is none. It only seems to you as if you hear 
something.  Your attention isn’t actually captured. It just seems to you 
as if it is captured. 
The patient would rightly complain that her attention is actually drawn away from 
voice of a conversational partner, or that it is actually occupied. This complaint seems 
legitimate, even though an analogous claim to the effect that there actually is 
something the patient hears would not be. But if attention is a non-propositional 
attitude, then what it means for the subject’s attention to be drawn from the voice she 
is listening to something else just is for her to first bear the relevant non-propositional 
attitude to the voice of her partner and then to something else. By denying 
hallucinatory attention, we are denying that the patient’s attention is drawn to 
anything. And that seems very implausible.  
How about denying existence implication? To deny existence implication is to hold 
that a subject might attend to something, even though the object of her attention does 
not exist, just like the object of fear or a desire – like the ghost in the castle or the 
impossible warm ice cream – need not exist. If existence implication is denied, then 
Macbeth is, after all, focusing his attention on a dagger. At the end of the day, I 
believe that existence implication may indeed have to be given up. But someone 
proposing this option incurs an obligation to explain the contrast between attention to 
a non-existing object and, for example, fearing such an object or desiring such an 
object that I have noted above (p. 12). We are happy to say that the child is afraid of a 
ghost, even though there is no ghost or that a person desires non-existing warm ice 
cream, while we are not happy to say that the child focuses her attention on a ghost or 
on warm ice cream. In the case of fear or desire it seems plausible to think of the 
intentional object as something like a reflection of the subject’s conception of what 
she is afraid of or what she desires. But, as we have seen attention seems to be non-
conceptual in the sense that the object of attention is independent of the subject’s 
conception of it. So, if existence implication is denied we need an explanation of why 
the object of attention seems independent of our conception of it. It is not clear how 
the NPA view could construct such an explanation. 
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How then about accepting the combination of hallucinatory attention and existence 
implication? A defense could draw on the fact just mentioned, i.e. that what it is that 
the subject attends to need not correspond to what she takes it to be, or to how it 
appears to her, or how she conceives of it. This is what we have described as the non-
conceptual character of attention. What Macbeth attends to, thus, need not be a 
dagger. This is how it appears to him, or how he conceives of the object of his 
attention. But it could in fact be something else; just like what captured the attention 
of the child in the scary castle was the rustling of the wind, and not a ghost – even 
though to her it appeared to be a ghost. So, in Macbeth case, what might the object of 
his attention be?  
One option would be to take it to be a mental object. This object need not be a 
traditional sense-datum, since it need not be how it appears to the hallucinating 
subject. Nevertheless, many will be suspicious of such mental objects.  
A second option would be to treat hallucinations as extreme cases of illusions, where 
some physical object or event appears to the subject radically differently from the 
way it actually is. Maybe our tinnitus patient’s attention is captured by a brain event 
that appears to her to be a sound in her environment. One problem for this view might 
be that which brain event the subject is attending to seems radically indeterminate. 19 
Another option is to hold that the hallucinating subject’s attention is captured by an 
uninstantiated property complex (see Johnston 2004). The qualities that, were she not 
hallucinating, would be instantiated by a particular sound or dagger in the case of 
hallucination are uninstantiated. According to this view the complex of these 
properties is the object of a hallucinating subject’s attention. What the subject takes to 
be a material object or event in fact is an uninstantiated universal. One problem for 
this view is that it commits us to a quite substantial metaphysical thesis regarding the 
existence of Platonic universals simply by reflecting on our own psychology. Not 
anyone will be comfortable with this sort of transcendental argument (for other 
arguments against it see Pautz 2007). 
Some will find one of the options discussed in this section defensible. Still, the first 
problem for the NPA view is to find a plausible way of treating hallucinatory 
attention. 
                                                
19 I have expressed sympathies with a view like this in my dissertation (Watzl 2010, Ch. 5). It is also 
defended by Rami El Ali (2014, 2017). In this earlier work I suggested that such indeterminacy is 
already present in some clear cases of illusion, and hence poses no special problems for the case of 
hallucination (consider, for example, a case where a complex set of prisms reflect light from 100 
different sources such that the subject has the visual appearance of a dagger. In such a case, it seems 
clear that the subject sees something, but which specific thing is it that she sees? The answer seems 
highly indeterminate). 
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3.2 The Dependence-Independence Problem 
I will now raise a second, and arguably more serious, problem for the NPA view. This 
problem arises from another issue I have touched on in my discussion of the 
propositional view. It concerns the dependent character of attention. There is both a 
certain form of dependence of attention on other intentional attitudes, and a form of 
independence of other intentional attitudes. How could both of these be true? This is 
the Dependence-Independence Problem. 
It is highly plausibly, as I have mentioned on p. 11 above, that a subject cannot only 
focus her attention on some object. Her mind must be directed toward that object also 
in some other way.  In order to focus her attention on an object the subject must, it 
seems, either perceive the object, have thoughts about it, or feel emotions directed at 
the object, etc. I believe that we should, thus, accept the following dependency claim: 
if a subject S attends to o, then, necessarily, S bears some other intentional attitude to 
o. 
Dependency cries out for explanation. Why is it true? Several explanations are 
available in principle: 
A first explanation for why A might depend on B is that A is identical to B. Attention 
thus might be identical to another intentional attitude. Pautz (2010), for example, 
suggests that maybe to focus attention on something just is to think about that thing. 
But it is implausible to think that all forms of, say, perceptual attention require 
thought about that object. This is most obvious for exogenous attention (attention 
capture). A subject whose attention is captured by an explosion need not think about 
that explosion. Indeed, perceptual attention seems to be generally more primitive than 
thought. While the latter requires conceptual capacities, the former does not, and 
arguably explains the ability for thought about an object. It is not identical to it. 
Perceptual attention thus cannot be identical to thought. But it also cannot be identical 
to perception. Visually attending to an object cannot just be seeing that object for one 
might see the object without attending to it. Overall, while attention to an object 
depends on other intentional attitudes about that object it seems that it cannot just be 
identical to those attitudes on which it depends. Something is added in attention. 
A second explanation for why A might depend on B is that A is one way of being B. 
If visually attending to something, for example, were a way of seeing that thing, then 
that would explain dependency. In general, attending could be a specific instance of 
the attitudes on which it depends. This, in effect, was the way the propositional view 
explained dependency. It conceived of visual attention, for example, as the visual 
representation of specific types of propositions. A generalization of this view would 
treat attention as an adverbial modification of the attitudes on which it depends (see 
Mole 2011 for another adverbial view of attention).  
Yet, the adverbial modification view is also problematic since attention can, as it 
were, look “inside” the attitudes on which it depends. I will consider the case of 
cognitive attention for illustration (though a similar case can be made for perceptual 
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attention). Consider that cognitive attention sometimes shapes propositional thought. 
Sometimes we are thinking or judging that something is the case. For example, I 
might think or judge that Ed wants coffee, that Rousseau was French or that I am 
going to walk to the office today. When the subject has an occurrent thought or makes 
an occurrent judgment her attention might be engaged. Yet, the subject’s attention 
might be directed towards only an aspect or part of the content that she is judging. In 
language, the phenomenon I am interested in is often expressed as focus marking.20 
Here are three examples of pairs of thoughts that differ only in which part of their 
content is focus marked. 
(8a) You wonder whether Ed wants coffee or tea. You think about it and 
then come to judge that Ed wants [coffee]F. 
 
(8b) You wonder who might want coffee. You think about it and then come 
to judge that [Ed]F wants coffee. 
 
(9a) For a long time you believed that Rousseau was French. Suddenly you 
realize that Rousseau was [Swiss]F. 
  
(9b) For a long time you believed that there were no great Swiss 
philosophers.  You suddenly realize that [Rousseau]F was Swiss. 
 
(10a) You’ve been in the habit of taking public transport to your office. One 
morning you come up with the brilliant idea that today you are going 
to [walk]F to the office. 
 
(10b) You’ve been in the habit of taking morning walks to various places in 
your neighborhood. One morning you come up with the brilliant idea 
that today you are going walk to the [office]F. 
 
In these three examples the subject has a certain occurrent thought (she judges 
something, realizes something or has a certain idea). The truth conditions for the 
thoughts in each pair are plausibly identical. Yet, there is a difference in the subject’s 
mental life. In (8a) the subject judges that Ed wants coffee and is focused on the fact 
that he wants coffee (rather than tea), while in (8b) she judges that Ed wants coffee 
and is focused on the fact that it is Ed who wants coffee (rather than someone else). It 
is highly plausible that this difference at least partially is a difference in the subject’s 
attention: at least part of what differs between (8a) and (8b) is what the subject 
attends to.  
In these cases, we thus seem to have the same thought but a difference in focus of 
attention. When you’re thinking that Ed wants coffee, your attention might be on Ed 
or it might be on the coffee (in fact: it can also be on him [wanting]F the coffee as 
well). 
                                                
20 E.g. Rooth 1992. 
 22 
What we see in this case of cognitive attention thus is that, on the one hand, the 
operation of attention depends on and hence necessitates the occurrence of certain 
thoughts. On the other hand, its structure need not match the structure of those 
thoughts. While the thoughts have propositional structure, attention often picks up on 
aspects of the contents of those thoughts and not their whole contents. The same, 
arguably, is true for visual attention. Visual perception presents a complex scene to 
the subject; it is directed at objects and at the visual properties. But attention is 
directed only at some aspects of the complex content of visual perception. But if 
attention picks up aspects of the contents of the attitudes on which it depends, then it 
cannot just be an adverbial modification of the attitudes on which it depends. While 
attention depends on other attitudes there can be a mismatch between the structure of 
attention and the structure of the attitudes on which it depends 
There is a third explanation for why A might depend on B. B might be a part of A. If 
it is impossible to play tennis without moving a racket, then that is because moving a 
racket is a part of what it is to play tennis. Specifically, the attitudes on which 
attention depends could be a part of attention. The explanation of dependency would 
consist in the fact that the mental states on which attention depends are parts of what 
it is to attend to something. 
I believe that this third explanation is the correct explanation. In the next section I 
will show how it is best spelled out. But in order to have that explanation available to 
us, we need to move beyond attitudes and their intentional contents and objects. If 
attention were fully constituted by intentional attitudes, then the only way other 
attitudes could be a part of attention is if attention were a combination of the attitudes 
on which it depends. Visual attention to an object would be the mereological sum of 
seeing that object and some other intentional attitudes. It is hard to see what those 
other attitudes could be (as we have seen visual attention does not always depend on 
thought; it is also not plausible to think that it always depends on, say, desire, 
imagination or emotion). It is thus hard to see how to implement the third type of 
explanation within a framework of only intentional attitudes.  
3.3 The NPS view21 
The last two sections have raised two problems for the NPA view. The first was the 
Hallucination Problem: how could attention both imply existence and occur in 
hallucination? The second was the Dependence-Independence Problem: how could 
attention depend on other mental states and yet not be reducible to those other mental 
states? 
The best way to solve these problems, I believe, is to give up strong intentionalism 
that conceived of the mind as a bundle of attitudes. If the mind is a bundle of attitudes 
then attention must either be an independent attitude or be fully reducible to other 
                                                
21 This section is a very rough sketch of the view I develop in detail in Chapters 2-7 of Watzl (2017). 
See especially Chapter 4+5. 
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attitudes. The Dependence-Independence appears to show that this is not possible. 
But once we give up the bundle of attitudes picture, a solution to the Dependence-
Independence problem naturally arises. Strong intentionalism assumes mental 
structure monism (there is exactly one correct partitioning of a subject’s mental life 
into its most fundamental elements, which are attitudes). Instead we should accept 
mental structure pluralism (a subject’s mental life can be partitioned along several 
equally appropriate dimensions). Mental structure pluralism allows us to think of 
attention as constituted by a special type of structure of the mind that cross-cuts its 
attitudinal structure. Specifically, I propose that attention is constituted by some parts 
of the mind being prioritized over other parts. It is this priority structure that 
constitutes attention. Since the structure that constitutes attention is a structure of 
intentional attitudes, attention depends on those attitudes. But since the structure is 
not exhausted by what is structured, attention is not reducible to those intentional 
attitudes. On the resulting NPS view, attention thus is constituted by a non-
propositional structure of the intentional mind.  
Let us see how to treat the case discussed in the last section, where you come to think 
that [Ed]F wants coffee. Call this mental episode the Ed episode. Your intellectual 
attention is on Ed, and not on him wanting coffee. According to the NPS view, the 
fact that you are intellectually attending to Ed in this particular case depends on the 
fact that you are thinking that he wants coffee. It is not an independent attitude added 
to having a thought with that propositional content. Yet, whether you are attending to 
Ed is also not fixed by the propositional content of your thought. We can see how 
both of these could be true, if we allow that the Ed episode can be partitioned in two 
distinct ways. 
First, it can be partitioned into attitude and content. The attitude here is thought and 
the content is the proposition that Ed wants coffee. This partitioning captures the 
representational structure of the Ed episode, and hence fixes the conditions under 
which that episode would be accurate, i.e. just if Ed wants coffee. 
Second, it can be partitioned into what is prioritized and what is not prioritized. What 
is prioritized in your thought is that it is about Ed, and what is not prioritized is that 
you attribute wanting coffee to him. This priority partitioning is independent of the 
representational structure of the Ed episode. It is the priority structure that fixes what 
is attended and what is not.  
We can make this more precise as follows. 
Let e be the Ed episode. e is a specific mental occurrence or event. Now divide e into 
two parts, the prioritized part eEd and the deprioritized part ewantingcoffee. eEd is the part 
of the Ed episode that makes reference to Ed, and ewantingcoffee is the part that 
predicates wanting coffee of Ed (though remember that both eEd and ewantingcoffee are 
parts of the mental episode, not parts of the content of that mental episode). What 
constitutes that our subject is attending to Ed now just is the fact that in e eEd is 
prioritized over ewantingcoffee. We can capture this structure as follows: let ‘>’ stand for 
the relationship of ‘higher priority’ between two mental episode parts, where e1>e2 
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just in case e1 is prioritized over e2. The priority structure of the Ed episode then is 
given by the fact that eEd > ewantingcoffee. 
Generally, the attention structure of a mental episode e is given as follows: [{ei}, 
ei>ej], where {ei} is a partitioning of that episode e such that each ei is a part of e and 
a structure on that partitioning is provided by the priority relation >. 
The prioritization thus orders the parts of mental episodes. What is important for 
present purposes is that which parts of a mental episode are prioritized is largely 
independent of how that mental episode represents the world to be. And indeed, we 
would expect such independence, since prioritizing some aspects of a mental 
representation should not interfere with the accuracy conditions of that mental 
episode. Two fully accurate representations of how things stand with Ed should be 
able to differ with respect to whether you are primarily concerned with Ed or with the 
fact that he wants coffee (or with the fact that he wants it, rather than hates it). 
Attentional priority plays a different role in our mental economy than representational 
accuracy, and hence we should expect that the representational structure of a mental 
episode and its attentional structure can vary largely independently of each other.  
Mental episodes, on the view I am proposing, thus have a multi-dimensional 
mereological structure, i.e. the fact that an episode can be partitioned in one way is 
compatible with the fact that it can also be partitioned in a different way. According 
to mental structure pluralism, a mental episode thus can have both propositional 
structure and priority structure. To these correspond two distinct but compatible ways 
of partitioning the relevant episode. If e is some propositional attitude, we can put this 
as follows. 
 e = [{ei}, ei>ej] = A-ing that p.  
The fact that the priority structure of the event of judging, for example, is independent 
of its propositional structure, thus, should not seduce us into thinking that events of 
thinking that p can be reduced to non-propositional attitudes such as thinking about 
something or predicating something of something. We should not think that a mental 
episode has some parts that are given independently of facts about attention and that 
these parts then enter into relations of relative priority when the subject attends to 
something. The relevant parts just are those aspects of a mental episode that can lead 
to differences in attention (no attention-independent partitioning is presupposed). The 
elements of the priority structure, like referring to x, or predicating F-ness, etc. are not 
separable attitudes. The subject could not refer to x without thinking some 
propositional thought about x. The parts that occur in the attention structure of an 
episode are rather divisions within that mental episode, not independent existents.  
On the resulting view, we have a straightforward account of why attention comes in 
different types of species: the different types of attention are distinguished by the 
elements that are prioritized in the subject’s priority structure. What distinguishes 
different varieties of attention, such as intellectual and perceptual attention is what is 
prioritized. In the case of perceptual attention, it is a perceptual episode. In the case of 
intellectual attention, it is a cognitive episode. What both have in common is their 
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structure. Both perception and cognition may be partitioned and structured by the 
priority relation. If they are so structured, we have perceptual and intellectual forms 
of attention.22 The more complex forms of attention that characterized, for example, 
attention to someone as a locus of worth and dignity may be characterized by priority 
structures that have, for example, certain affective states in prioritized positions. 
The NPS view also solves the problems raised for the NPA view: 
The dependence-independence problem consisted in a tension between the following 
two claims. On the one hand, in order to attend to something a subject must represent 
the object of her attention in some other way. It is impossible to just attend to 
something. On the other hand, attending to something cannot be reduced to those 
ways of representing the object. The NPS view solves this problem straightforwardly. 
Since attention is constituted by a structure of the subject’s mental life, there can be 
no attention without a mental life characterized independently of attention. Since 
intellectual attention, for example, just is a structure in the subject’s cognition, it 
presupposes cognition. Similarly, since perceptual attention is constituted by a 
structure in the subject’s perceptual state, it presupposes that there are such perceptual 
states. In this sense, attention thus depends on other aspects of mentality. At the same 
time the NPS view also explains why attention cannot be reduced to those perceptual 
or cognitive states on which it depends. Since it is constituted by a structure of the 
subject’s mental life, it is not captured by simply listing the aspects of the mental life 
that it structures.  
The NPS view can also explain how the attention of a hallucinating subject may be 
engaged: attention is constituted by the fact that some aspects of a mental life are 
prioritized over others. Given that it is uncontroversial that the mental life of a 
hallucinating subject exists, there is no difficulty for some parts of that mental life to 
be prioritized over others. So, the attention of our tinnitus patient is engaged since her 
auditory experience as of a sound gets involuntarily prioritized over other aspects of 
her mental life. This, indeed, is a plausible description of what is disturbing for her. 
While she might want to prioritize thinking about her work, it is her auditory 
experience that gets actually prioritized. Arguably this is all that we need to account 
for. 
Some may not find that this is not yet completely satisfactory. Don’t we also need to 
explain how the subject’s attention can be directed at what seems to her a sound in 
her environment? That is: don’t we need to explain that there is some seemingly 
external object that captures her attention? 
We can make progress by noting that priority structure in a certain sense creates 
subject-dependent objects out of the representation of propositional contents. In the 
priority structure, there will be a part of the tinnitus patient’s auditory experience that 
                                                
22 While attention may come in such distinct intellectual and perceptual forms, this is not an essential 
part of the structuralist proposal. It is rather an empirical question. Priority structure need not follow 
the attitudinal contours of a mental life. Maybe a whole mental life at a time has only one priority 
structure.  
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is prioritized. That part of her experience moves to top priority in the attention 
structure. It is uncontroversial that the relevant part of the experience exists. Yet, the 
priority of that part of the subject’s experience also marks a part of the content of her 
experience. We can think of that part as the mirror image of the relevant location in 
the structured experience in the content of that experience. The existence of that 
“highlighted” part of the content directly depends on the relative priority of a part of 
the subject’s experience. In that sense, it is a mind-dependent object of the relevant 
experience. The object of hallucinatory attention thus indeed exists, but its existence 
is entirely dependent on and fully explained by the fact that an episode of 
hallucinatory attention exists. It is, in that sense, no further fact. The NPS view thus 
also has an answer to the hallucination problem. 
With the foregoing, we can also explain the sense in which attention is non-
conceptual. According to the NPS view, the priority structure of a subject’s mental 
life is explanatorily prior to her attention being directed at object’s and features in the 
world around her. What she is attending to is simply a reflection of the mental state 
that is prioritized. Consider the child in the nightly castle. She hears a certain noise. 
That auditory state is prioritized. In that auditory state the noise is presented to her as 
the sounds of a ghost. But, in fact, the auditory state is a perception of the wind. And 
so what she attends to just is that wind. Now consider Macbeth. Suppose, first, that 
Macbeth is perceptually attending to a real dagger. That episode consists in having a 
perceptual experience in which the experience of the dagger is prioritized. Now 
suppose that Macbeth is hallucinating a dagger in a way that is subjectively 
indistinguishable from perceptually attending to the real dagger. According to the 
NPS view he is indeed attending, since some part of her experience is prioritized over 
the other parts. He is not attending to the dagger, though, since that part of his 
experience does not refer to the dagger (since there is no such dagger). What he is 
attending to – in the case of hallucination – is entirely dependent on the existence of 
her priority structured experience. Generally, what a subject attends to need not be 
transparent to her or depend on her conception of it, since the character of a mental 
state that is prioritized (whether it, for example, picks out a dagger) need not be 
transparent to the subject. 
3.4 In what sense, then, is attention intentional? 
According to the NPS view attention is not an intentional attitude. In this sense, it is 
not an intentional phenomenon. What then of the arguments of Section 2.1 that 
attention is intentional according to both the pragmatic, the phenomenological and the 
intuitive conceptions of intentionality? What does the NPS view say about the 
intentional character of attention along these three dimensions? I will take them in 
reverse order. 
First, the NPS view is consistent with the claim that attention is an essential 
component of a solution to Wu’s Many-Many Problem (see p. 8 above). According to 
the NPS view, attention is constituted by a priority structure within the subject’s 
mental life. The rationalizing explanation of action that is the solution to the Many-
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Many problem draws on that priority structure. It is partly with the help of her priority 
structure that a subject carves out a behavioral path through the way she represents 
the world. While the details would, of course, need to be developed, a subject’s 
priority structure thus is arguably intimately intertwined with other aspects of her 
mind that operate together in a rationalizing explanation of action, and thus attention 
would count as intentional according to the pragmatic conception, even though it is 
not an intentional attitude. 
Second, the phenomenological conception of intentionality conceives of the 
intentionality of a subject’s mental life as her point of view on the world. According 
to the NPS view, attention contributes to that point of view because it organizes the 
subject’s mental life so that some of its elements are prioritized over others. Attention 
thus contributes to a subject’s perspective by organizing it in terms of what takes 
priority. The NPS view thus can count attention as intentional according to the 
phenomenological conception. There is a clear intuitive sense in which two subjects 
that differ only in their priority structure appear to themselves to inhabit a different 
sort of universe (cf. James 1890/1981, p. 424), even though they do not take the 
world to be different. They organize the world in a different way. 
Third, what about the idea that attention is a paradigmatic intentional relation that 
“includes” the object of attention within itself? The NPS view can explain why some 
instances of attention are paradigms of intentional relations even though attention is 
not an intentional attitude. According to the NPS view, the intentional directedness of 
attention piggybacks on the intentional directedness of the mental element that is 
prioritized. Consider the subject who is perceptually attending to an explosion outside 
her window. According to the NPS view a subject’s undergoing that mental episode 
just is a subject’s being in a perceptual state that – among other things – represents 
that explosion (not necessarily as an explosion) in such a way that the part of that 
perceptual state that is intentionally directed at the explosion is prioritized over other 
parts of that perceptual state. The intentional directedness of attention in this case thus 
is fully explained by the intentional directedness of the relevant perceptual state. 
Susan Carey was right to hold that perceptual attending and perceiving are 
paradigmatic intentional relations. But there are not two independent intentional 
relations here, but only one primary one (perceiving) and one (perceptually attending) 
that has the other as a part. The NPS view thus is consistent with the fact that some 
instances of attention are paradigms of intentionality. At the same time, it is also 
consistent with the existence of instances of attention that are not intentional at all: if 
there are non-intentional mental states (like sensations), thus could also be elements 
of priority structures. The NPS view is neutral on the question whether there are any 
such non-intentional elements. 
Overall, then, the NPS view rejects strong intentionalism. It is consistent with but 
does not entail weak intentionalism. And it can explain how attention could be 
intentional (possibly in all cases) without being an intentional attitude.  
 28 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have discussed two views about attention: a non-propositional attitude 
view, and a non-propositional structure view. I have shown that the non-propositional 
attitude view should be taken seriously. Attention is intentional and cannot be fully 
explained in terms of propositional attitudes. But the non-propositional attitude view 
also encounters two serious problems. In order to overcome those problems, we 
should give up the idea that attention is an attitude, and accept the non-propositional 
structure view instead. 
The account of the non-propositional character of attention argued for in this paper 
shows that strong intentionalism should be rejected. The mind is not a bundle of 
attitudes, but has a priority structure that cross-cuts its attitudinal structure.  
The non-propositional structure view also shows that the non-propositional character 
of attention is compatible with propositionalism. The view entails that our mind has 
non-propositionally structured parts, but those non-propositionally structured parts 
normally are not intentional attitudes. The relevant parts may be aspects of a 
propositional attitude whose existence is fully grounded in propositional attitudes and 
priority structure. By drawing on such priority structures, the account of attention 
provided here, thus, may offer resources for how propositionalism treats other alleged 
non-propositional attitudes. 
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